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Chapter V
TAMING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS:  CAN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION FIND A SOLUTION?
By Biswajit Dhar and Murali Kallummal
Introduction
In 1947, the multilateral trading system was established through the formalization
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the objective of ensuring the
elimination of border protection measures arising from the pursuit of discriminatory policies.
The  process  of  trade  liberalization  that  was  thus  initiated  has  since  become  almost
synonymous  with  the  lowering  of  tariffs.   Yet,  the  critical  issue  of  NTBs  has  remained
sidelined.  The consideration given to this issue appeared to be just enough to protect the
protagonists  of  trade  liberalization  against  criticism  that  they  were  reluctant  to  ensure
distortion-free markets were put in place.  The results were along expected lines.  For
a number of decades, GATT had to face the criticism that it had established a regime that
had worked for the lowering of tariffs while turning a blind eye to the growing incidence of
NTBs.
WTO could scarcely do any better.  Disciplining NTBs was included as a part of the
negotiations on non-agricultural products.  More importantly, the two agreements that were
explicitly included in the Uruguay Round package for monitoring the growth of standards in
recent decades have been questioned regarding their effectiveness, and were substantially
left outside the purview of the current round.
An issue that assumes importance in the context of the handling (or non-handling)
of the NTB issue by the multilateral trading system is the identification of an NTB.  The
assumption has been that these barriers result in distortions in the marketplace, stemming
essentially from their discriminatory application.  However, this is only the beginning of the
problem in identifying NTBs.  The policy regimes that countries have established have also
spawned instruments that are aimed at addressing “market failures”.  Thus, “barriers” have
been put up to ensure that the markets do not result in undesirable outcomes.  Analysts
have tried to differentiate such “barriers”, which have been introduced as a way of addressing
“market failures”, by christening them as NTMs.  However, the jury is still out on whether
an NTM can, under some circumstances, appear as an NTB.
This chapter is in the nature of a status report of the handling of the NTB issue by
the  multilateral  trading  system  during  the  six  decades  that  it  has  been  in  existence.
Section A reflects on how the received literature has addressed NTBs.  The focus of the
analysts has largely been on NTMs, which, in the view of the authors, has shifted attention
away from the NTBs and which therefore needs urgent attention at this juncture.132
The handling of NTBs by the multilateral trading system is discussed in sections B
and C.  The main focus of this discussion is on the current round of negotiations in which
WTO members are expected to provide a framework for disciplining NTBs.  This discussion
indicates that the identification of NTBs by WTO members has revealed that their exporters
consider some of the so-called NTMs to be technical barriers, and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures as NTBs.
This  brings  us  back  to  the  point  made  above  –  it  is  imperative  for  the  WTO
members to carry out a detailed review of the agreements on technical barriers to trade
(TBT),  and  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  (SPS)  measures  to  ascertain  whether  these
so-called NTMs are behaving more like NTBs.  The authors believe that this review is
necessary, given the high degree of proliferation of these measures since 1995.  Section D
makes this point while analysing the trends in the growth of TBT measures.
A.  Understanding the phenomenon of NTMs
This  section  explores  the  analytical  framework  as  well  as  the  evidence  for
understanding the phenomenon of NTBs, beginning with a discussion of some of the more
contemporary literature on the subject.  A brief discussion follows regarding available data
on NTMs, with the focus on the widely consulted UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information
System (TRAINS) database (see annex table 1).
The existing literature on NTMs covers a vast area of trade policy instruments that
are beyond the simple definitions of tariffs (ad valorem and non-ad valorem).  Based on
two broad classifications of goods and services, these can be categorized into two groups:
those that discriminate trade in goods and those that distort market access for service
providers.  A number of studies have been carried out on the trade distortion effect of
non-tariff  instruments  since  the  1970s,  covering  instruments  from  subsidies  to  trade
facilitation issues.  This section attempts to briefly present the broad contours of those
studies, which covered the use of “regulatory protection” as a trade policy tool and looked
at its trade-distorting effects.
In  a  seminal  work  in  1970,  Baldwin  defined  non-tariff  instruments  as  measures
(public or private) that caused internationally traded goods, services, or resources devoted
to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such a way as to reduce
potential  real  world  income.    Baldwin’s  classification  seems  to  have  expanded  NTMs
beyond the trade policy arena, covering even micro elements such as transfer pricing that
fall under competition-related matters.  This definition was too ambitious to apply in the
real world, as concepts such as potential real world income are very fuzzy and difficult to
define.
A rather simple approach was adopted by Greenway (1983, p. 132). He categorized
these regulatory instruments into direct and indirect instruments, based on explicit and
notional effects on trade flows.  They covered a large variety of instruments belonging to
quantitative,  fiscal  and  administrative  measures.    Taking  a  similar  line,  Hillman  (1991)133
provided a general definition covering all forms of restrictions, other than traditional customs
duties, that act as NTMs by distorting international trade.  However, it should also be noted
that defining trade distortion may not be always easy, as it is often very difficult to quantify
it, especially when “expectations” are taken into account.
However,  the  most  practical  approach  to  understanding  the  negative  impact  of
NTMs was largely taken in the context of its probable effect on trade flows (Deardorff and
Stern,  1998).    Hence,  the  most  common  element  in  the  definition  of  NTMs  in  a  large
number of studies was the negative impact on trade volumes, directly and indirectly through
price effects.  But as Beghin and Bureau (2001) point out, a unifying methodology for
assessing the impact of NTMs does not exist given the heterogeneous nature of these
regulations.
The  nature  of  the  coverage  of  various  instruments  under  the  WTO  agreement
brought some distinction to the definitional approach used in the studies on NTMs.  These
studies  defined  NTMs  based  on  the  legitimacy  of  certain  instruments  provided  in  the
various agreements, and therefore excluded issues on negative impacts related to compliance
and transparency.  In their attempt to define NTBs, Hillman (1997) and Roberts and De
Remer (1997) sought to distinguish between those regulations designed to protect local
industry and those designed to protect consumers.  Subsequently, Roberts (1998) and
Roberts  and  others  (1999)  defined  NTMs  as  a  set  of  regulations  that  included  many
policy  instruments.   Accordingly,  they  categorized  the  instruments  by  the  scope  of  the
barrier, regulatory goal, legal discipline, type of market restriction, product category and
geographical region.  Again, it was a broad definition, and it clearly highlighted differences
in the protectionist nature of various measures.  They found an overall equilibrium impact
in a sector or in the economy where the NTM was applied.  The analytical framework
suggested in this case is to take account of three broad effects:  (a) regulatory protection
effect – rent to domestic sector; (b) supply shift effect – compliance cost impact in terms of
increase in domestic supply; and (c) demand shift effect – new information effect, which
leads to increased demand.  All these effects are analysed in a welfare-oriented approach.
The approach adopted was intended to isolate only those measures as NTMs that
restrict  trade  alone,  and  it  did  not  address  some  legitimate  concerns  of  governments/
countries (protection of health and the environment, and safety).  The measure, which
would  address  the  legitimate  concerns  under  TBT  and  SPS,  would  not  be  termed  as
NTMs.  Hence, legitimacy of the measure becomes an important criterion for the NTM
definition.  Some these trends can be observed in a large number of surveys conducted on
business concerns of WTO issues by United States business councils such as the United
States – China Business Council (2003).  This survey made clear distinctions of SPS and
TBT  measures  (standards  and  regulations)  from  that  of  other  NTMs  such  as  quotas,
licensing/tendering requirements, and government and industrial restrictions.
On the other hand, Maskus and others (2001) suggested a method of comparing
a measure to a situation when the measure would have been implemented if it had been
designed for domestic purposes.  Here, the principle of national treatment is taken as134
a criterion for judging the measure.  It would mean that if the regulation or standard is
applied for both foreign and domestic products, then the measure is not trade-distorting
and hence not an NTM.  Maskus suggested the need for closer examination of the impact
on trade and national welfare in the context of standards and technical regulations (NTMs).
The literature also identifies the effects of small and large firms on NTMs.  The cost
of regulations affects these two segments of an industry in different ways, thus modifying
the structure of competition or the size of the relative markets affecting the profit mark-up
and rents.  Granslandt and Markusen (2000) also accounted for the fact that standards
could impose a fixed cost of entry that would affect competition, and might also lead to
multiple equilibria, an effect well known in industrial organization.  The simplest approach
to standards is that when they differ between countries, they constitute a real trade cost
for exports trying to penetrate the foreign market.  However, the study by Granslandt and
Markusen  (2000)  suggested  that  incompatible  standards  were  particularly  harmful  for
small/poor countries who could not win a “standards war”.  As there is a fixed cost of any
standard, with multiple equilibrium, they suggested that the welfare differences between
different players would be large, creating an important coordination role for public policy.
However, the study clearly highlighted the lack of quality in empirical evidence, given that
the  existing  data  sources  did  not  provide  sufficient  information  regarding  the  various
quantitative effects.
In the context of shift in supply curves, Bureau and others (1998, pp. 437-462)
 and
Bureau and Marette (2000, pp. 170-198) argued that regulations bring information and
therefore avoid or reduce the cost of assessing product quality (the “lemon problem”).
Similar views can be found in Casella (1996) and Fisher and Serra (2000), who suggested
that such measures would behave like a public good and would manifest similar effects.
Casella  concluded  that  standards  and  regulations  respond  to  a  society’s  demand  for
specific public goods, and as such can we expect them to be shaped by preferences,
endowments, and technologies – the fundamental determinants of this demand.  There is
no a priori reason why standards should be equal in different societies.  This paper also
studied the interaction between standards and international trade.  It showed that although
standards can be used to manipulate trade flows, there is no logical connection between
standards harmonization and gains from trade.  Moreover, standards themselves will be
modified by the opening of trade and under reasonable assumptions; harmonization will be
one of the outcomes of free trade.  The empirical evidence suggests that industry groups
are assuming an increasing role in shaping government regulations (Casella, 2001).  In
this perspective, standards need not be automatically identified with national policies, and
the possibility of international alliances of industry groups must be considered.  This study
supports the results of the study by Milner across industries.  The result of market integration
is then international harmonization together with increased differentiation across industries
(Casella, 1995 and 1996).
Regulations and standards can also lead to a rise in the elasticity of substitution in
demand,  leading  to  network  externalities  and  even  economies  of  scale,  by  permitting
producers to settle on a limited range of products.  However, the supply of a range of135
products  that  do  not  necessarily  fit  consumers,  demand  a  variety  of  attributes.    Such
a trend could also manifest in a manner that would help technologically capable countries
over those, which do not have technological capability in terms-of-trade effect (Harrison
and Tar, 1996; Maskus and Wilson, 2000).  Although at the micro level the results could be
mixed,  at  the  macro  level  technological  capability  and  financial  control  can  seriously
influence the trading patterns in favour of the industrial countries.
Incorporating environmental factors, Blyde (2000) showed that, if a country specialized
in the production of dirty goods, it did not necessarily become dirtier, as predicted by the
pollution haven hypothesis.  Trade equilibrium is constructed where a rich country specializes
in the production of the clean good, a poor country specializes in the production of the
dirty good, and both countries become cleaner after the gains from trade are internalized.
The result casts serious doubts on the effectiveness of using trade restrictions to improve
the environmental conditions of developing countries, as proposed by some environmental
groups.  From the environmental point of view, the use of restrictions can be counterproductive,
not only for the poor country but also for the rich country (Blyde, 2000).
The review of literature on NTMs and their effects on trade clearly highlights an
important point that there are other effects of standards and regulations that need to be
addressed.  Further, there is a large gap between the ambitious analytical framework and
the applied estimates of the effects of NTMs.  The approaches that have been adopted
can be categorized as follows:
(a) Trade effect – mercantile measure constructing the tariff equivalent;
(b) Welfare effect – entire economy effect (global);
(c) Distribution effect – use of social account matrix;
(d) Resource cost effect – deadweight losses (administrative cost and cost of
resources to rent seeking); and
(e) The impact of industrial restructuring.
To  analyse  the  above-mentioned  effects,  empirical  models  have  to  analyse  the
effects  of  regulations  and  standards  on  various  issues  such  as  supply,  the  extra  cost
induced, the price differences between foreign and domestic producers, among others.
1
However, most of the studies undertaken so far have been carried out in the context of
effects  on  developed  countries,  firms  and  markets.    In  terms  of  sectors  taken  up  for
analysis, existing studies have attempted to analyse the impact of standards and regulations
for agricultural and animal products largely in the context of developed markets.  Most
studies have not captured the effects of the standards that are being set by the developed
countries and, more recently, by the advanced developing countries, on other developing
and the least developed countries.  This, in the view of the authors, is a serious flaw since
it does not take into consideration the fact that the least developed countries face severe
1 Annex table 3 provides the salient features of some of these studies.136
constraints arising from their limited availability of resources and are thus unable to meet
the  challenges  posed  by  the  increasing  proliferation  of  regulations  and  standards.   As
a result, the ability of those countries to enhance their market access prospects looks
rather bleak.
The constraints that these countries face are epitomized by their limited technological
capabilities, which have long been recognised as impediments to improving their presence
in the global markets.  Although the global community has been discussing this issue for
a considerable period, mainly through the efforts made by UNCTAD to improve the conditions
of under which developing countries can access technologies that can improve their ability
to compete in the global markets, very little progress has been made in that direction.
More recently, WTO also began considering this issue after the Doha Ministerial Conference
mandated the establishment of the Working Group on Trade and Technology Transfer,
which is expected to submit “recommendations on steps that might be taken within the
mandate of WTO to increase flows of technology to developing countries”.  In the light of
the above-mentioned factors, addressing the differences in capabilities to meet standards
and  regulations  (which  exist  globally  and  even  between  groups  of  countries)  becomes
imperative while analysing the economic effects of NTMs.
One  of  the  major  limitations  in  understanding  the  implications  or  the  potential
implications of NTMs/NTBs is the lack of a proper database that captures these measures
in a comprehensive manner.  This can alone lead to focused policy initiatives being taken
to address the problems that are faced because of these measures.  The efforts that have
been made towards documenting NTMs/NTBs, most notably by UNCTAD, are discussed
briefly below.
The pervasive impact of NTMs was first recognized at the international level in
the 1960s after the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations included it in its negotiating
mandate.
2 Following this, UNCTAD took the lead in developing an inventory of NTMs of
the participating countries.
3 In 1973, the compendium contained more than 800 NTMs.  In
1986, UNCTAD conducted a comprehensive research project to identify country-by-country
NTMs, which revealed many more NTMs (Laird and Yeats, 1990).
The most comprehensive compilation of publicly available information on NTBs/
NTMs is contained in the UNCTAD TRAINS database, which is accessible through the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software.  The NTB data incorporated in TRAINS
indicate the existence of categories of NTBs classified according to the UNCTAD Coding
System of Trade Control Measures (TCMCS) for particular products or groups of products.
Additional information such as a brief description of each NTB, an indication of affected or
excluded countries, and footnotes on exact product coverage are provided, where available.
2 Developments related to NTMs in GATT are discussed in greater detail in a later section.
3 The format for this inventory is included in annex table 1.137
TCMCS currently under rinsion. identifies more than 100 different types of NTBs at
its  most  detailed  level  (annex  table  2).    This  classification  does  not  include  measures
applied to production or to exports.  NTBs are broadly classified into six chapters, from 3
to  8  (chapters  1  and  2  are  reserved  for  tariff  and  para-tariff  measures,  respectively),
according to the intent or immediate impact of the measures:
(a) Chapter 3 – price control measures.  Measures intended to control the prices
of imported articles for the following reasons:
(i) To sustain domestic prices of certain products when the import price is
inferior to the sustained price;
(ii) To establish the domestic price of certain products because of price
fluctuations  in  the  domestic  market  or  price  instability  in  the  foreign
market; and
(iii) To counteract the damage caused by the application of unfair practices
in foreign trade.
Most of these measures affect the cost of imports to a variable degree
calculated on the basis of the existing difference between two prices for the
same product, compared for control purposes.  The measures initially adopted
can be administrative fixing of prices and voluntary restriction of the minimum
price level of exports or investigation of prices to subsequently arrive at one
of  the  following  adjustment  mechanisms:    suspension  of  import  licences,
application of variable charges, anti-dumping measures or countervailing duties;
(b) Chapter 4 – finance measures.  Measures that regulate access to, and the
cost of foreign exchange for imports as well as define the terms of payment.
They may increase the import costs in a fashion similar to tariff measures;
(c) Chapter  5  –  automatic  licensing  measures.    Freely  granted  approval  of
applications for imports or monitoring of import trends for specified products,
sometimes through inscription in a register.  They may be applied to signal
concern over import surges and to persuade trading partners to reduce export
growth.  They may also be applied for environmental purposes.  Sometimes
they are a precursor to import restraints.
(d) Chapter 6 – quantity control measures.  Measures intended to restrain the
quantity of imports of any particular good, from all sources or from specified
sources of supply, through restrictive licensing, fixing of predetermined quotas
or prohibitions.
(e) Chapter 7 – monopolistic measures.  Measures that create a monopolistic
situation  by  giving  exclusive  rights  to  one  economic  operator  or  a  limited
group of operators for social, fiscal or economic reasons.
(f) Chapter 8 – technical measures.  Measures referring to product characteristics
such as quality, safety or dimensions.  They include the applicable administrative
provisions, terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking
and labelling requirements as they apply to a product.138
Its comprehensive coverage notwithstanding, the TRAINS database has several
limitations.  The first problem with this database stems from the large diversity of measures
deemed to be causing the market access problems that it covers.  Because these measures
are so diverse and sometimes non-transparent, their trade-distorting effects are extremely
difficult to assess.  Except for quotas, for which tariff-equivalents can be estimated, albeit
with a fair amount of statistical margin of error, for other NTMs there are no theoretically
correct  and  empirically  sound  measures  for  the  estimation  of  trade  distorting  effects
(Martin, 1997).  In addition, the quality of databases on NTMs has often been pointed to as
an additional problem; this limitation shows up especially when NTMs are used for explaining
trade distortion effects.  Even the most recent NTMs database provided by WITS does not
cover the latest information on new, and additions to existing standards (annex table 4).
These  limitations  seem  ungainly  when  considering  the  fact  that  the  TRAINS
database is a combined attempt by three premier multilateral institutions (the World Bank,
the United Nations Statistical System and UNCTAD).  Researchers who make extensive
use  of  the TRAINS  database  would  perhaps  be  justified  in  expecting  this  database  to
adopt a more scientific approach in providing data that is of such prime importance.  The
database needs to be significantly improved in terms of the clarity it affords in respect of
the various measures that it covers.  However, perhaps most importantly, information on
NTMs for a relatively longer period is not available for many countries.
The only available data set for across-country NTM frequency is for the case of
20 countries.  Here again a two-point comparison of NTMs based on WITS for a set of
20 countries (for which two-point data on NTMs is available – 1999 and 2001) suggests
that in 2001, nearly 23 per cent of products (many of which represent two-digit HS codes)
did  not  indicate  the  relevant  objective  and  the  type  of  NTMs  applied  by  the  country
concerned.  In addition, while NTM details are available along national lines, NTMs for
which no description was provided in 2001 headings under the respective chapters in the
database.  Quite clearly, it is a serious case of non-transparency, where the objective for
the application of NTMs is unavailable for empirical analysis.  Hence, although the missing
NTM objectives across this set of 20 countries stands at 23 per cent, their exact coverage
at the six-digit level may be much higher; however, these would depend on the number of
subheadings under the respective chapters in the database.
It is also expected that WITS would provide a comprehensive view of the market
access conditions.  However, WITS has been found to provide limited coverage.  The
country-wise updating of the database suggests that only in the case of 22 countries, NTM
data were available for two separate periods; in addition, for all those countries, the latest
coverage year was 2001.  Of this list, only one country belonged to the developed category.
The coverage of NTMs as per the available information from WITS is better for developing
countries than for developed countries.  Among the QUAD (with the exception of Japan),
the two largest markets – the United States and the European Union – have information
up until 1999.139
Information on NTMs is a critical component of trade policy formulation.  Therefore,
the non-availability of such information during negotiations on critical agreements, such as
that on agriculture as well as non-agricultural market access (NAMA), urgently needs to be
addressed.  This information gap is one of the biggest constraints facing WTO negotiators,
particularly those from the developing countries.
B.  GATT and market access negotiations
The foregoing discussion provides a useful backdrop to understanding the manner
in which the multilateral trading system has dealt with the issue of NTBs.  Established in
1947  through  the  adoption  of  GATT,  the  multilateral  trading  system  was  expected  to
substantially  reduce  tariffs  and  other  barriers  to  trade,  and  to  eliminate  discriminatory
treatment in international commerce.
4 With regard to NTBs, the focus of GATT was on the
most prevalent form, i.e., quantitative restrictions (QRs) that the GATT Contracting Parties
had imposed for a variety of reasons, including addressing balance of payments problems.
Accordingly, several articles of GATT dealt with the issue of QRs.
Evidence of a dilution in dealing with NTBs became evident as the GATT Contracting
Parties provided the larger picture of their intent in the form of the Havana Charter,
5 which
was to have formed the basis of the functioning of the International Trade Organization
(ITO).
6 Several critical deviations were made from the expressed intent by GATT to deal
with the “other barriers” to trade, and these deviations formed a part of Article 20 of the
Havana Charter, which provided for general elimination of QRs.  While articulating the
need to eliminate the prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, Article 20 provided the
prospective members of the organization with the freedom to impose restrictions necessary
for the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of
commodities in international trade.
Furthermore, Article 21 allowed any member “to restrict the quantity or value of
merchandise permitted to be imported... in order to safeguard its external financial position
and  balance  of  payments”.    It  was  clarified  that  such  QRs  could  only  be  applied  by
a  member  to  (a)  forestall  the  imminent  threat  of,  or  to  stop,  a  serious  decline  in  its
monetary reserves, or (b) in the case of a member with very low monetary reserves, to
achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.  The QRs imposed by a member
were  to  be  progressively  relaxed  and  ultimately  eliminated,  as  that  member’s  external
financial position improved.  This idea, mooted in the Havana Charter, was subsequently
modified as GATT Article XVIII:B.  This Article was designed to allow developing countries
to control the general level of their imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise
4 Preamble to GATT, 1947.
5 Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, 1948.
6 ITO was envisaged as a part of the triumvirate of organizations that was expected to ensure the
orderly conducting of business in the global economy.  However, ITO was not established because of
opposition by the United States.140
permitted to be imported, in order to safeguard their external financial position and ensure
a  level  of  reserves  adequate  for  the  implementation  of  their  economic  development
programmes.
Much of the efforts in the initial years of GATT were devoted to the elimination of
QRs.  During those years, notable progress was made towards the elimination of restrictions
applied under Article XII (GATT, 1973).  However, concerns were expressed with regard to
the “residual restrictions” that were imposed on products where BOP safeguards were not
warranted and no GATT justification existed (GATT, 1983).
However, while GATT appeared to have moved towards restricting the use of QRs,
it had also to contend with new developments that were ostensibly aimed at restricting
trade.  Two developments are particularly noteworthy – not the least because the initiatives
for  imposing  those  restrictions  were  taken  by  the  United  States.    In  1955,  the  United
States sought a waiver of the provisions of Article II and Article XI of GATT in order to
implement Section 22 of its Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which allowed the farm
administration to provide price support to farmers.  An amendment was adopted in 1951,
which stipulated that no international agreement into which that the United States had
entered  would  be  applied  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  Section  22.
According to the United States, the waiver was required in order to remove any possible
inconsistency between the obligations of the United States under the General Agreement
and  that  Section  to  permit  the  fulfilment  of  this  Congressional  mandate  (GATT,  1955).
Although  several  Contracting  Parties  were  in  favour  of  eliminating  the  restrictions  by
a  specific  date,  the  United  States  maintained  that  such  an  action  ran  contrary  to  the
objectives for which the waiver was being sought.  The implications of this waiver granted
to  the  United  States  were  far-reaching  –  it  provided  carte  blanche  use  of  QRs  in  the
agricultural  sector,  which  was  in  vogue  until  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  took  the
decision to convert all NTBs existing in agriculture into tariffs.  This point needs particular
emphasis since the decision to grant the waiver did not affect the obligations of the United
States under any other provisions of the Agreement, and particularly its obligations under
Article XIII that did not allow discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions.
The second major development that introduced export restrictions was the adoption
in 1961 of the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles.
Major importers of cotton textiles in the developed world argued that rapid imports from
the developing countries were putting their domestic industries at considerable risk.  The
United States pointed out that an increase in imports of cotton textiles in 1960, which
reflected a growing trend over many years, raised both economic and political problems
for the country.  In the view of the United States, a “Short-Term Arrangement” was required
to  mitigate  the  immediate  problem  faced  by  its  domestic  textiles  industry  by  imposing
restraints  on  textiles  imports  and  that  this  could  be  replaced  later  by  a  “Long-Term
Arrangement”  after  giving  due  consideration  to  the  interests  of  the  parties  involved  in
trading in cotton textiles.  As in the case of agriculture, the import restrictions, accomplished
in this case by using import quotas, became a permanent feature of the international trade
until it was finally dismantled in 2005.  Ironically, the “Short-Term Arrangement” was adopted141
after the Committee III, which was established to consider measures needed to promote
trade of developing countries as a part of the Programme of Action Directed towards an
Expansion of International Trade.
QRs, both agricultural and non-agricultural, were the subject of negotiations during
the Kennedy Round (1963-1969), but little progress was made.  However, an important
initiative was taken during that period to develop an Inventory of Non-tariff Measures that
was undertaken under the guidance of the Committee on Trade in Industrial Products.
7 It
was in the area of NTMs rather than QRs that the Kennedy Round made a new beginning.
This  was  the  result  of  the  agreement  between  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties  that  the
negotiations would deal not with only tariffs but also with NTMs.  The main outcome of that
effort was the development of the Anti-dumping Code in 1967.
The GATT work programme on NTMs experienced significant expansion during the
Tokyo Round.  In fact, six multilateral instruments on non-tariff measures were negotiated
during the Tokyo Round:
(a) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade;
(b) Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII;
(c) Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures;
(d) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI;
(e) Agreement on Government Procurement; and
(f) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII.
Although  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  were  formally  launched  in  1986,  the
blue-print  for  that  eighth  Round  of  GATT  negotiations  was,  in  effect,  provided  by  the
Declaration adopted at the end of the Ministerial Conference held in 1982.  With regard to
NTMs, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration took the following decision:  “To review, in a group
created for the purpose, existing quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff measures,
the grounds on which these are maintained, and their conformity with the provisions of the
General Agreement, so as to achieve the elimination of quantitative restrictions which are
not in conformity with the General Agreement or their being brought into conformity with
the  General Agreement,  and  also  to  achieve  progress  in  liberalizing  other  quantitative
restrictions and non-tariff measures, adequate attention being given to the need for action
on  quantitative  restrictions  and  other  measures  affecting  products  of  particular  export
interest to developing countries”.  Backed up by this elaborate statement of intent, the
Uruguay Round negotiating mandate merely reiterated that the aim of the negotiations
was “to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures, including quantitative restrictions ...”
The  Negotiating  Group  on  Non-Tariff  Measures  established  for  dealing  with  the
issues at hand had the daunting task of defining the scope of the negotiations.  Some of
7 See annex table 5.142
the  delegations  argued  that  since  the  Tokyo  Round  had  taken  the  initiative  to  rein  in
several NTMs, the Negotiating Group should focus on the “most serious problem areas
such as import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, VERs, variable levies, MFA restrictions
and non-automatic licensing”.  It was further suggested that in order to effectively deal with
the issue of NTMs, an adequate database should be established.  The need to establish
a database for identifying NTMs was particularly significant, as it indicated the difficulties
that the GATT Contracting Parties continued to face while dealing with this vexing issue,
despite expending considerable amount of negotiating capital since the decision to prepare
the NTMs inventory was taken during the Kennedy Round.
It is interesting to note that the framework and procedures for the negotiations on
NTMs was not adopted until February 1990, i.e., more than three years after the launch of
the Uruguay Round.  In fact, the negotiating process required an additional set of guidelines
from the Ministers, which was provided through the mid-term review that was undertaken
in April 1989.  The negotiating guidelines provided by the mid-term review included the
following key elements:
(a) Various  negotiating  approaches  can  be  applied  to  these  negotiations,
including  multilateral,  formula  and  request-offer  approaches.    However,
approaches,  which  ensure  the  widest  participation  and  broadest  possible
liberalization, are to be preferred;
(b) To ensure that concessions to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures are
not subsequently nullified or impaired, participants agree to explore the most
appropriate measures to achieve this objective.
(c) There should be provisions for immediate or staged implementation of results
over agreed time-frames.
(d) If elimination of a non-tariff measure is not possible, consideration may be
given to transforming it into a tariff.
(e) Participants will receive appropriate recognition for the liberalization measures
that they have adopted.
In keeping with the above-mentioned negotiating guidelines, the framework and
procedures for the negotiations on NTMs proposed three sets of approaches for dealing
with the issue.  These were (a) multilateral rule-making approaches, (b) multilateral formula
approaches, and (c) request and offer approaches.
The GATT Contracting Parties proposed multilateral rule-making approaches for
a  number  of  NTM  categories.    The  more  prominent  of  these  were  issues  related  to
pre-shipment inspection, Rules of origin and import taxes.  The focus of negotiations in
that set of approaches was, however, on the issues of pre-shipment inspection and rules
of origin.
Australia made a strong pitch for the formula approach, suggesting that the two
most common elements of non-tariff protection, i.e., price- and quantity-based measures,143
could be effectively addressed by using this approach.  Australia’s views were based on
the  request  lists  that  countries  had  submitted  with  regard  to  NTMs  that  they  wanted
removed.  The list showed that the price- and quantity-based measures were the most
numerous.  The measures included in the list were licensing, price support measures,
prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, tariff quotas, voluntary export restraints (VERs), export
subsidies and levies.
Taking a contrary view of this issue, the European Communities (EC) opined that
“it  will  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  engage  in  a  systematic  or  formula-based  trade
negotiation to reduce or eliminate NTMs as required by the Uruguay Round Declaration”.
Even in the area of quantitative restrictions, which, according to the EC members, was
“the most homogeneous and theoretically quantifiable NTM”, the “trade-inhibiting effect of
different  kinds  of  restrictions”  was  very  difficult  to  measure.    The  EC  members  were
therefore of the view that it was “unrealistic to seek to establish a standard procedure for
tackling trade negotiations in this or any other sector of non-tariff measures where evaluation
is currently subjective or entirely lacking”.
The  request-and-offer  approaches  were  expected  to  be  bilateral  consultations
based on the initial request lists submitted by the Contracting Parties.  At the same time,
plurilateral discussions involving participants having shared interests were to be encouraged.
The negotiations on NTMs indicated that some GATT Contracting Parties were interested
in establishing new rules with regard to only two areas, i.e., pre-shipment inspection and
rules of origin.  These issues were incorporated in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round
negotiations in the form of two independent agreements.  However, the request-and-offer
approach was backed by too few Contracting Parties for it to make a mark in the disciplining
of NTMs as mandated by the Punta del Este Ministerial.  While the requests were made by
more than 30 countries, only two Contracting Parties (one of which was the EC members)
tabled their offers.
The lack of progress in the negotiations aimed at disciplining NTMs was appropriately
summed up by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market Access, formed after the
Brussels  Ministerial  Conference  failed  to  conclude  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  in
1990.    It  was  stated  that  there  was  “no  substantial  progress  in  the  negotiations  with
respect to product-specific, non-tariff measures not dealt with in other negotiating groups.
This adversely affects the prospects of achieving a balanced market access package for
many participants” (GATT, 1991).
This statement remains a poignant reminder of the fact that the failure to introduce
disciplines on NTMs has introduced an imbalance in the multilaterally agreed set of rules.
While quantitative restrictions that the GATT Contracting Parties had maintained for balance
of payments reasons were subject to a “sunset clause”,
8 the other restrictions on imports
8 While  agreeing  on  the  “Understanding  on  the  Balance-of-Payments  Provisions  of  the  General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” that was adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations,
“members confirm their commitment to announce publicly, as soon as possible, time-schedules for the
removal of restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes” (paragraph 1).144
(including those that were the result of discriminatory use of standards) were eventually
not addressed as a part of the rubric of market access negotiations.  With SPS measures
and technical barriers to trade being addressed by stand-alone agreements, abridgement
of market access conditions resulting from the use of these standards were expected to be
addressed by the disciplines introduced therein.
The inclusion of NTBs in the negotiating mandate of the Doha Round once again
highlights the point that effective disciplines are needed to address problems that these
market access restrictions can cause.  The negotiating mandate, however, kept the focus
of negotiations on this issue restricted to only non-agricultural products.  However, as is
shown in the following discussion, this narrowly defined scope has brought forth several
practical problems in making any kind of progress towards fulfilling the negotiating mandate.
C.  WTO and the disciplining of NTBs
One of the most significant outcomes of the Uruguay Round negotiations was that
several NTMs were brought under closer scrutiny.  The agreements covering those NTMs
provided an institutional mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the functioning of NTMs.
At the same time, it firmly established a distinction between the “WTO-compatible” barriers
(C-NTBs) and “WTO non-compatible” barriers (NC-NTBs).  Although it is too early to make
a clear distinction between these two categories, some preliminary judgements can be
formed based on the nature of agreements.  The ongoing negotiations are primarily addressing
the issue of elimination and restriction of those instruments that fall into the category of
NC-NTBs.  However, there are those such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which are discussed in the
context of compliance and transparency with regard to making NC-NTBs compatible under
the WTO framework.
The latter part of this chapter discusses C-NTBs that are covered under the SPS
and TBT Agreements.  It could be said that the need for such “regulatory” measures,
9
which are different from “standards”, was a direct outcome of high living standards and
increased air, water and soil pollution that led to the search for environmentally-friendly
products.  Combined with this, the nature of international production networks and the
relative advantages enjoyed by the developed countries in terms of technological superiority
may also be considered as having contributed to the emergence of these measures.
9 There  is  an  important  distinction  between  product  regulation  and  standards.    The  difference
between a standard and a technical regulation lies in compliance.  While conformity with standards is
voluntary, technical regulations are mandatory by nature.  They have different implications for international
trade.  If an imported product does not fulfil the requirements of a technical regulation, it will not be
allowed onto the market.  In the case of standards, non-complying imported products will be allowed
on the market, but then their market share may be affected if consumers prefer products that meet
local standards (e.g., quality or colour standards for textiles and clothing).145
1.  ‘WTO non-compatible’ NTBs and non-agricultural market
access negotiations
The Doha Ministerial Declaration made a major departure from the past when it
mandated the market access negotiations to address the problem of “non-tariff barriers”
instead of the more ubiquitous “non-tariff measures” that were included in the negotiating
mandates in the past.  This change in nomenclature had two significant dimensions.  First,
the focus on NTBs could be considered as a step towards clarifying the scope of the
negotiations.  As discussed above, the focus of the Uruguay Round market negotiations
on  NTBs  created  the  problem  in  that  several  of  the  “non-tariff  measures”  were  being
discussed in other negotiating groups, and this created jurisdictional overlaps.  The second
dimension, and one which caused a new set of problems, was that the Declaration gave
no guidance as to how NTBs would be identified.  In fact, much of the negotiating capital
has been devoted to defining the scope of the negotiating mandate on NTBs.
A second set of issues of critical importance from the point of view of the negotiations
was the modalities/methodologies to be adopted for the conduct of the negotiations.  This
dimension has immense significance from the point of view of ensuring that definite outcomes,
which are also practical from the point of view of implementation, are obtained at the end
of the negotiations.  These issues are dealt with in the following discussion.
The NTB work programme in the Doha Round was preceded by some work that
the WTO members had done on this issue with regard to the IT sector.  In this sector,
steps  have  been  taken  towards  the  identification  and  subsequent  development  of
a  harmonized  structure  on  NTBs  under  the  WTO  work  programme.    The  NTB  work
programme,  which  began  at  the  end  of  2000,  had  three  phases.    In  November  2000,
a “Non-Tariff Measures Work Programme” was launched by the Committee of Participants
on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Committee) to identify
NTBs and assess their impact on IT trade.
In  11  submissions  to  the  ITA  Committee,  the  participating  countries  identified
wide-ranging forms of NTBs.  Although a majority of the identified NTBs fell within the
standards and the conformity assessment area, customs procedures and import licensing
were some of the more prominent among the other forms of NTBs.  Following a Canadian
proposal, the Committee took up a pilot project for specific standards-related NTBs regarding
conformity  assessment  procedures  for  electromagnetic  compatibility/electromagnetic
interference (EMC/EMI).  The EMC/EMI Pilot Project resulted in a set of “guidelines” for
EMC/EMI conformity assessment procedures, prepared by the ITA Committee.
The  successful  completion  of  the  EMC/EMI  Pilot  Project  raises  the  substantial
point  of  using  the  experience  gained  for  addressing  the  issue  of  NTBs  in  the  NAMA
negotiations.  Several participants in the ITA Committee commented on the likely linkages
with the NTBs agenda being pursued by the Negotiating Group on Market Access (NGMA)
(WTO, 2004 and 2005).  The key issue in this regard is the whether or not the approach
followed in the EMC/EMI Pilot Project could be extended to cover other areas.  This point
assumes importance in view of the fact that, so far, there is no agreement within the ITA146
Committee to use the EMC/EMI Pilot Project experience in other areas.  There seems to
be some divergence of opinion in this regard, with some participating countries indicating
that  particular  areas  of  concern  for  developing  countries  could  be  examined  using  the
template provided by the EMC/EMI Pilot Project.  It may appear that the EMC/EMI experience
has limited applicability given that the progress achieved under ITA with regard to NTMs
has not been satisfactory.  The long list of unfinished standards under the ISO, and looking
at the similar number of other formalized standards that require an understanding at the
multilateral level, is testimony to this fact.
(a) Defining the scope of NTBs
In one of the early submissions to NGMA, New Zealand focused on this issue in
a systematic manner, pointing out that the top seven of the so-called NTBs identified by its
exporters included those that could, on examination, be found to be “WTO-legal”.  They
included standards and certification, customs procedures, food safety and health requirements.
To obviate this problem, New Zealand suggested the scope of the negotiations on NTBs
could be defined using the following classifications:
(a) Issues that might be addressed in negotiations elsewhere under the Doha
mandate;
(b) Issues or proposals involving substantial change to existing WTO agreements;
(c) Proposals involving clarification of existing rules;
(d) Issues involving disputed interpretation of rules;
(e) Issues open to bilateral resolution;
(f) Products of interest to developing countries;
(g) Capacity issues;
(h) Implementation issues;
(i) Special and differential provisions (WTO, 2002a).
Canada provided similar guidance on defining the scope of the negotiations on
NTBs, based on the views expressed by the country’s exporters.  Canada identified four
sets of so-called NTBs (WTO, 2002b).  These were:
(a) Quotas;
(b) Import licensing, rules of origin, customs valuation, SPS and TBT;
(c) Tariff classification;
(d) Border-related measures including customs procedures, fees and administration.
Of these four categories, Canada’s view was that the NTB negotiations could take
up only the first set of issues, since all the other sets included issues that either were
a part of existing WTO agreements or were being negotiated in other negotiating groups.147
Yet  another  suggestion,  which  addressed  a  more  specific  issue  concerning  the
developing  countries,  was  made  by  India.    In  India’s  view,  legitimate  instruments  that
developing countries might use under the various WTO agreements for development of
their industries should not be included as NTBs.  For example, export tariffs or levies are
generally  used  to  generate  resources  to  develop  an  industry  by  diversification  in  the
product  profile  and  development  of  value-added  products  for  export.    India,  therefore,
suggested that “export duties be negotiated...outside the Doha mandate” (WTO, 2002c).
In  their  submissions,  members  identified  three  sets  of  NTBs  that,  in  their  view,
were outside the purview of the NTB negotiations being conducted by NGMA.  These
were:
(a) NTBs related to existing WTO agreements (e.g., customs valuation, import
licensing, PSI, SPS and TBT) that are not subject to a specific negotiating
mandate;
(b) NTBs related to other WTO agreements that are also the subject of a negotiating
mandate (e.g., AD and CVD);
(c) NTBs that are already part of the Doha Declaration (e.g., trade facilitation,
transparency in government procurement, and services).
A parallel process for identifying NTBs that could be included in the market access
negotiations was initiated by the NGMA chairman in 2002.  Two letters were sent, requesting
notification by members of NTBs that their exporters were facing in various markets.  This,
in effect, meant that the chairman was putting in place a process for the development of
a database of NTBs, in a manner similar to that which had been attempted in the past.  As
mentioned above, an initiative was taken during the Kennedy Round (in 1968) for developing
the Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures (annex table 6) in the context of the work done in the
Committee on Trade in Industrial Products.  The format for the submission of notifications
as suggested by the Chairman was based on the structure that was used for developing
the Inventory.  This process resulted in the submission of a large number of notifications in
which  WTO  members  identified  the  NTBs  that  their  exporters  were  facing  (see  WTO,
2003c and WTO, 2003d).
Fliess and Lejarraga (2005) provided an interesting analysis of submissions made
by  the  WTO  members  in  which  they  reported  NTBs  that  their  exporters  were  facing
(WTO,  2006b).    In  those  submissions,  members  identified  the  relevant  GATT/WTO
Articles/Agreements  that  could  be  applied  to  the  NTBs  thus  identified.    Fliess  and
Lejarraga reported that the NTB categories with the highest incidence of notifications were
TBTs (530 NTB entries – almost half the total), customs and administrative procedures
(380 entries) and SPS (137 entries).  Quantitative restrictions, trade remedies, government
participation  in  trade,  charges  on  imports  and  barriers  falling  under  the  other  groups
amounted to less than 5 per cent of total NTB entries.  Interestingly, the SPS Agreement
was also identified as a source of NTBs.  This was the case, too, when market access for
non-agricultural products was under scrutiny.148
Quite clearly, the SPS measures used by countries affected not only the food/feed
sectors, but also the industrial sectors.
13 This finding raises the question as to whether the
WTO members had used the TBT Agreement to impose trade restrictions that were not
intended to “create unnecessary obstacles to international trade”, but rather to develop
“international standards and conformity assessment systems” that could make contributions
“by improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade”.
Given that the objective of improving market access is one of the fundamental objectives
of the current round of negotiations, the above-mentioned evidence with regard to NTBs
raises the critical issue of whether the tendency to exclude measures taken under the TBT
and SPS Agreements from the purview of NTBs can be justified in the light of the evidence
presented above.  The importance of the point can be better understood from the discussion
later  in  this  chapter  pointing  to  the  rapidly  increasing  tendencies  shown  by  the  WTO
membership to use TBT and SPS measures.  The authors’ view is that there is merit in
critically examining the TBT and SPS measures as a part of the market access negotiations,
given that the Doha Ministerial Conference provided the mandate for introducing effective
disciplines on NTBs.
(b) Specific modalities and methodologies
The  submissions  made  by  the  participating  WTO  members  in  NGMA  on  the
modalities/methodologies that can be adopted for dealing with NTBs can broadly be divided
into five categories:
(a) Vertical or sectorial approaches;
(b) Horizontal or multilateral approaches;
(c) Requests/offers, bilateral, or plurilateral;
(d) Dispute settlement;
(e) Tariffication of NTBs.
The first three approaches were also supported by the WTO members in the July
framework, which was adopted in order to put the Doha Round back on track after the
failed Cancun Ministerial Conference had severely eroded confidence, particularly of the
major trading nations, in the multilateral trading system.
13 A careful analysis of the SPS notifications introduced by the United States and their potential
coverage of the measures included in these notifications.  An example in this regard will clarify this
point.  In 2003, the United States issued an SPS notification covering “Products that use the pesticides
1,3 benzene dicarboxylic acid etc.”  The scope of this SPS measure was elaborated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) (Federal Register: 7 March 2003 [vol. 68, No. 45]).  EPA clarified that the
potentially affected entities may include, but were not limited to crop production, animal production,
food manufacturing, pesticide manufacturing and antimicrobial pesticide.  EPA further stated that this
listing was not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a guide for readers regarding entities
likely to be affected by this action.149
The  vertical  or  sectorial  approach  found  considerable  support  among  the  WTO
membership  in  the  early  phase  of  the  negotiations.   The  sectoral  approach  was  often
considered useful in addressing NTBs in sectors of key importance to a country or groups
of countries.  Support for the vertical approach is based on two sets of considerations.
First, most countries feel that this approach is consistent with the overall framework of
“sequenced globalization”.  Countries can engage in “cherry picking”, selecting the sectors
that best suit their larger economic objectives for a “fast track” removal of NTBs.  The
second “positive” in favour of the vertical approach, a point made by the United States,
was that countries are increasingly engaging in the process of dismantling market access
barriers in specific industries.  While in WTO, the ITA has been witness to discussions
being conducted for the reining in of NTBs, members of APEC have been dealing with
similar issues in the chemicals and automobiles sectors (WTO, 2003a).
The United States, which has been the strongest supporter of the vertical approach,
considers NTB packages that bundle together a number of NTB issues relevant to a single
industry could be a creative new approach for dealing with NTBs (WTO, 2003b).  According
to the United States, this approach has practical relevance in today’s world as industries
are becoming increasingly networked; intra-industry confabulations have often dealt with
issues  related  to  NTBs  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  industry.
14 Adopting this single
industry, or vertical, approach as one NTB modality could, in view of the United States,
lead to better management of the negotiating process.
Thus far, the option of following the sectorial approach has been explored actively
in  a  wide  variety  of  sectors,  including  marine  products,  textiles,  pharmaceuticals  and
automobiles.  In addition to the United States, which sponsored two meetings on NTBs in
the automotive and footwear industries, the possibility of adopting the vertical approach
was actively pursued by several countries.  The Republic of Korea focused on the electronics
industry, Canada on forestry products, New Zealand on wood products, and Switzerland
on pharmaceuticals and chemicals.  In July 2005, members including the United States,
New  Zealand  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  met  informally  to  discuss  common  sectoral
positions on forestry products (to harmonize building codes), electronics and automobiles.
However, despite the apparent advantages, particularly in terms of calibrating the
process of liberalization, the negotiations on NTBs have given rise to several contentious
issues.  Among the more problematic proposals that have been made thus far is the one
put forward by the United States on automobile NTBs.  The United States has argued that
the automobile industry faces a plethora of market access barriers that include:
(a) Strict and/or excessively burdensome restrictions on the ability of the private
sector  to  offer  financing,  hampering  the  ability  of  consumers  to  purchase
motor vehicles;
14 Among the industries that fit the description given by the United States is the automobile industry.
The Global Auto Industry Dialogue (GAID) has seen broad-based consultations between automotive
industry associations in a large number of developing and developed countries.  GAID has, in recent
years, increasingly been calling for the introduction of enhanced disciplines on NTBs.150
(b) A lack of openness in respect of distribution channels for imported products;
(c) The application of vehicle taxes based on engine displacement in a manner
that burdens foreign manufacturers disproportionately because they produce
vehicles with large engine sizes;
(d) Foreign equity restrictions that constrain or distort investments in automotive
production;
(e) Barriers to importing and selling manufactured products.
These so-called market access restrictions mentioned by the United States deal
with issues that are in no way related to the market access negotiations for the reasons
indicated below.  The issue pertaining to the distribution channels is currently being discussed
in  the  services  negotiations.    The  investment-related  issue  is  one  that  members  have
decided not to include in the current round of negotiations, while the issue of domestic
taxation is an area outside the jurisdiction of WTO.  Thus, even while recognizing the
utility of following the vertical approach, WTO members need to be careful not to allow
non-issues to influence the negotiating process.
Although the horizontal approach did not find as much support as that given to the
vertical approach, the former has one inherent advantage as WTO members have some
degree of prior experience in dealing with it as a part of the negotiations on the Customs
Valuation Agreement and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  More importantly,
they are now actively engaged in the negotiations on trade facilitation.  Support for the
horizontal approach has come from the EC.  According to the EC, “disciplines on specific
non-tariff barriers are unlikely on their own to be effective in removing all obstacles to
trade, especially when some of them are immediately replaced by new barriers.  For this
reason, members should explore whether additional horizontal mechanisms could be useful
in addressing unnecessary barriers affecting market access so that measures taken by
members are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective”.
The request-offer approach has not been widely discussed yet, but this approach
can emerge as one of the stronger options given that the WTO members have already
prepared a not insignificant list of NTBs that their exporters face.  However, as pointed out
above, NGMA would first have to address the critical jurisdictional issue, as many NTBs
that were identified by the members were essentially those that were clearly outside the
purview of this negotiating group.
More recently, the NAMA-11 group of developing countries
15 and members of the
EC have proposed that the NTB issue can be addressed by setting up an “NTB Resolution
Mechanism”  (WTO,  2006b).    These  countries  have  argued  that  the  “NTB  Resolution
Mechanism” would be “guided by the principle of ‘good faith’ and conciliatory negotiations
wherein every member would make a concerted effort to resolve the NTB at hand, under
15 The following WTO members made the submission on behalf of the NAMA-11 group:  Argentina,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, the Philippines, South
Africa and Tunisia.151
the guidance of a mutually agreed ‘facilitator’.  Members would be required to engage with
the intention of arriving at a solution to the NTB.  It would be informal, low-key and less
adversarial than the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), and without prejudice to
the rights of members under the DSU”.  The key objective of the mechanism, as visualized
by  the  NAMA-11  group  would  be  to  find  pragmatic  solutions  to  trade  effects  by  using
expert facilitators to find the “solution”.  An NTB (which could include sectoral/plurilateral
elements) submitted to the resolution mechanism would require the facilitator to provide
recommendations on the solution after establishment of facts and trade effects.  It was
further provided that procedure adopted would be flexible and the “facilitator” would be
free to choose the preferred method.  The “facilitator” would consult the involved members,
either individually or collectively, the WTO Secretariat, affected industries and other experts,
including from industry and non-governmental organizations.
A similar proposal has been made by the members of the EC for addressing the
vexing  issue  of  NTBs.    The  EC  members  have  stressed  the  need  to  “add  to  existing
structures a new horizontal mechanism that enhances the opportunities for members to
address – in a conciliatory and expedient manner – any trade measure that affects trade
with another member.  This would provide a means of resolution that could make resorting
to dispute settlement unnecessary in certain cases”.  The EC members argued that the
“establishment of horizontal mechanism, in the form of a procedure for problem-solving in
the area of NTBs, with short timelines as well as with the involvement of a facilitator, can
assist countries in reaching mutually agreed solutions” (WTO, 2006a).
2.  Trends in the use of “WTO compatible” TBT measures
Nearly four decades after the initiation of a multilateral negotiation on the reduction
of NTMs for free global trade and enhancing market access, the world is now facing one of
its most difficult and complex regimes.  Since the establishment of WTO in 1995, both the
number of TBTs and the spread of such measures across the member countries are fast
outstripping and undermining the trade liberalization achieved by way of tariff reduction
and elimination.  As the table below clearly shows, the use of TBTs by WTO member
countries has been on the rise, especially under the WTO regime.  In 1995, 365 TBT
notifications were issued, while in 2005, 900 notifications were issued.
As the table shows, the number of TBT notifications issued has not seen a secular
increase, but has fluctuated around an increasing trend.  After an initial spurt was witnessed
between  1995  and  1997,  when  the  total  notification  issues  reached  almost  850,  TBT
notifications fell by almost a third by 2001.  This phase was followed, however, by one in
which the notifications increased by nearly 60 per cent over the 2001 trough.  A more
noteworthy feature of the TBT notifications is the steep increase in the number of countries
that have been involved in issuing notifications.  In 1995, only 26 of the 123 WTO members
issued TBT notifications, yet during 2005, 67 of the 148 members were active in issuing
TBT notifications.
Quite obviously, the increase in the number of countries active in terms of issuing
TBT notifications was because of increased interest shown by developing countries.  Again,152
the number of developing countries that issued TBT notifications far outstripped the OECD
member countries.  This phenomenon is illustrated by the following figure showing trends
in TBT notifications.
In  1995,  the  developing  countries  had  a  mere  10  per  cent  share  in  the  total
notifications issued during that year.  However, in 2005, the share of those same countries
had increased to more than 60 per cent.  The emergence of developing countries as new
players  in  the  application  of TBTs  is  reflected  in  the  increased  number  of  notifications
made by them, from 40 in 1995 to almost 550 in 2005.  In sharp contrast, the OECD
members saw a fall in their total number of notifications, from 349 in 1995 to 319 in 2005.
However, despite increasing the number of notifications issued during recent years, the
share of developing countries in the total notifications issued during 1995-2005 was just
over  41  per  cent.    In  other  words,  the  OECD  member  countries  have  continued  the
process of building in new standards to the already existing list of NTMs that existed even
before  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  and  developing  countries  appear  to  be  in  an
undue hurry to catch up.  However, the fact that the former group of countries will continue
to have a larger number of TBTs in the foreseeable future can have significant implications
for developing countries that will be seeking greater market access in the larger economies
at the end of the current round of negotiations.
Yet another interesting feature of the TBT notifications observed over time is that
most countries with a relatively high share of the total notifications in more recent years
belong to the group of countries having relatively low tariffs.  In 2005, for example, China
had the largest share (13 per cent) of TBT notifications issued while Brazil had a 7 per
cent share.  None of the top 10 per cent countries in terms of total notifications issued in
Use of TBTs by WTO members, 1995-2005




countries  planned economies
1995 349 40 0 389
1996 395 105 0 500
1997 640 206 0 846
1998 445 235 0 680
1999 432 260 4 696
2000 419 188 23 630
2001 298 277 7 572
2002 308 298 14 620
2003 305 533 55 893
2004 291 398 29 718
2005 319 544 37 900
Source: Centre for WTO Studies, IIFT, New Delhi.153
2005 had average industrial tariffs exceeding 10 per cent.  They included OECD members
belonging to the European Union as well as the United States and Japan.  This observed
association between tariffs and the use of NTMs such as TBTs appears to confirm the view
that the focus of the multilateral trading system on tariff reduction has only resulted in
a proliferation of NTBs.  The authors, however, are aware that substantially more work
needs to be done in this direction to allow conclusive comments to be made on this issue.
D.  Conclusion
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, this discussion is in the nature of a status
report  on  how  the  multilateral  trading  system  has  addressed  the  issue  of  NTBs.    An
attempt has been made to describe the developments in both GATT and, more recently,
WTO in order to analyse this issue.  Past developments have made it fairly clear that
a considerable distance will have to be traversed before the multilateral trading system
can put in place a meaningful set of disciplines covering NTBs.
This observation should be viewed with some concern since, in recent years, there
has been a proliferation of NTBs.  WTO members participating in NGMA have indicated
that their exporters perceive the so-called WTO-legal NTMs, such as TBT and SPS measures,
as market access barriers.  The increase in the use of TBT measures, particularly by the
more  advanced  developing  countries,  is  contributing  to  the  increase  in  complexities  in
what seems to be a veritable maze of NTBs.
Trends in TBT notifications across country groups
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Annex
Annex table 1.  Non-tariff measures data coverage across countries:
TRAINS database (as of 2005)
Sl. No.
Countries for which two years’ NTM data
Years available
are available
1 Algeria 2001, 1999
2 Argentina 2001, 1999
3 Bolivia 2001, 1999
4 Brazil 2001, 1999
5 Brunei Darussalam 2001, 1997
6 Chile 2001, 1999
7 China 2001, 1997
8 Colombia 2001, 1999
9 Ecuador 2001, 1999
10 Egypt 2001, 1999
11 Japan 2001, 1996
12 Mexico 2001, 1999
13 Morocco 2001, 1999
14 Nigeria 2001, 1994
15 Paraguay 2001, 1999
16 Mexico 2001, 1999
17 Morocco 2001, 1999
18 Paraguay 2001, 1999
19 Peru 2001, 1999
20 Taiwan Province of China 2001, 1999
21 Uruguay 2001, 1999
22 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2001, 1999
Summary of WITS database Number of countries
A NTMs data available, of which 88
   Developed 13
   Developing 75
B No record on NTMs 71
C Total countries 159
Source: Collated and compiled by the authors.155
Annex table 2.  UNCTAD coding system on trade control measures
Code Description
1000 Tariff measures
1100 Statutory customs duties
1200 MFN duties
1300 GATT ceiling duties






1600 Temporary reduced duties
1700 Temporary increased duties
1710 Retaliatory duties
1720 Urgency and safeguard duties
1900 Preferential duties under trade agreements
1910 Interregional agreements




2200 Additional taxes and charges
2210 Tax on foreign exchange transactions
2220 Stamp tax
2230 Import licence fee
2240 Consular invoice fee
2250 Statistical tax
2260 Tax on transport facilities
2270 Taxes and charges for sensitive product categories
2290 Additional charges, n.e.s.
2300 Internal taxes and charges levied on imports
2310 General sales taxes
2320 Excise taxes
2370 Taxes and charges for sensitive product categories
2390 Internal taxes and charges levied on imports, n.e.s.
2400 Decreed customs valuation
2900 Para-tariff measures, n.e.s.
3000 Price control measures156
3100 Administrative pricing
3110 Minimum import prices
3190 Administrative pricing, n.e.s.





3340 Flexible import fees









3900 Price control measures, n.e.s.
4000 Finance measures
4100 Advance payment requirements
4110 Advance import deposit
4120 Cash margin requirement
4130 Advance payment of customs duties
4170 Refundable deposits for sensitive product categories
4190 Advance payment requirements, n.e.s.
4200 Multiple exchange rates
4300 Restrictive official foreign exchange allocation
4310 Prohibition of foreign exchange allocation
4320 Bank authorization
4390 Restrictive official foreign exchange allocation, n.e.s.
4500 Regulations concerning terms of payment for imports
4600 Transfer delays, queuing
4900 Finance measures, n.e.s.
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5270 Prior surveillance for sensitive product categories
5700 Surrender requirement
5900 Automatic licensing measures, n.e.s.
6000 Quantity control measures
6100 Non-automatic licensing
6110 Licence with no specific ex-ante criteria
6120 Licence for selected purchasers
6130 Licence for specified use
6131 Linked with export trade
6132 For purposes other than exports
6140 Licence linked with local production
6141 Purchase of local goods
6142 Local content requirement
6143 Barter or counter trade
6150 Licence linked with non-official foreign exchange
6151 External foreign exchange
6152 Importer’s own foreign exchange
6160 Licence combined with or replaced by special import authorization
6170 Prior authorization for sensitive product categories




6212 Allocated to exporting countries
6220 Bilateral quotas
6230 Seasonal quotas
6240 Quotas linked with export performance
6250 Quotas linked with purchase of local goods








6360 Prohibition on the basis of origin (embargo)
6370 Prohibition for sensitive product categories
6390 Prohibition, n.e.s.
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6600 Export restraint arrangements
6610 Voluntary export restraint arrangements
6620 Orderly marketing arrangements
6630 Multi-fibre arrangement (MFA)
6631 Quota agreement
6632 Consultation agreement
6633 Administrative cooperation agreement
6640 Export restraint arrangements on textiles outside MFA
6641 Quota agreement
6642 Consultation agreement
6643 Administrative cooperation agreement
6690 Export restraint arrangements, n.e.s.
6700 Enterprise-specific restrictions
6710 Selective approval of importers
6720 Enterprise-specific quota
6790 Enterprise-specific restrictions, n.e.s.
6900 Quantity control measures, n.e.s.
7000 Monopolistic measures
7100 Single channel for imports
7110 State trading administration
7120 Sole importing agency
7200 Compulsory national services
7210 Compulsory national insurance
7220 Compulsory national transport
7900 Monopolistic measures, n.e.s.
8000 Technical measures
8100 Technical regulations




8150 Testing, inspection and quarantine requirements
8190 Technical regulations, n.e.s.
8200 Pre-shipment inspection
8300 Special customs formalities
8900 Technical measures, n.e.s.
Source: UNCTAD, 1994, Directory of Import Regimes, Part I.
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Annex table 3.  
Analytical frameworks for measurement of NTMs:  
A





Conclusion of the study
Practical issues
A.
Price wedge (tariff-equivalent) method
1.
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rade impact of NTMs
2.
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the results
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and United States (imports of
diary products)
European Union exports to
United States
1.
When limited number of countries
use regulations then they tend to be
used as barriers
2.
Standards vary in importance across
markets
3.
Cannot make distinction between
those that have an impact on trade
more from those that have no impact
4.
International Dataset have limitation
of partial coverage of countries
(uneven reporting)
5.
Only United States makes data on
actual detentions at border available.160
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1.
These studies does not explain NTM
impact alone
2.
Results sensitive to assumption
of the model
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Some standards do not show
statistically significant variability161
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Conclusion of the study
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Annex table 4.  Latest year for which NTM data are
available in the TRAINS database (as of 2005)











Source: Compiled from WITS Internet version database provided
by the World Bank, UNCTAD and IMF.
Annex table 5.  GATT inventory of non-tariff measures










E Consular formalities and documentation
F Samples




B Health and safety standards
C Other standards concerning product content
D Requirements concerning packaging and labelling and marks of origin164
Annex table 6.  World Trade Organization inventory of non-tariff measures
Parts and sections Description
Part I Government participation in trade and restrictive practices
tolerated by governments
A Government aids, including subsidies and tax benefits
B Countervailing duties
C Government procurement
D Restrictive practices tolerated by governments
E State trading, government monopoly practices, etc.




D Consular formalities and documentation
E Samples
Part 4 Specific limitations
A Quantitative restrictions and import licensing
B Embargoes and other restrictions
C Screen-time quotas and other mixing regulations
C Exchange control
E Discrimination resulting from bilateral agreements
F Discriminatory sourcing
G Export restraints
H Measures to regulate domestic prices
I Tariff quotas
X Others
Part 5 Import charges
A Prior import deposits
B Surcharges, port taxes, statistical taxes
C Discriminatory film taxes etc.
D Discriminatory credit restrictions
E Variable levies
F Border tax adjustments
G Emergency action
Source: GATT, 1973.
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Part III Barriers to trade
A General
B Technical regulations and standards
C Testing and certification arrangements
Part IV Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
A General
B SPS measures including chemical residue limits, freedom from
disease, specified product treatment etc.
C Testing, certification and other conformity assessment
Part V Specific limitations
A Quantitative restrictions
B Embargoes and other restrictions of similar effect
C Screen-time quotas and other mixing regulations
D Exchange controls
E Discrimination resulting from bilateral agreements
F Discriminatory sourcing
G Export restraints
H Measures to regulate domestic prices
I Tariff quotas
J Export taxes
K Requirements concerning marking, labelling and packaging
L Others
Part VI Charges on imports
A Prior import deposits
B Surcharges, port taxes, statistical taxes, etc.
C Discriminatory film taxes, use taxes, etc.
D Discriminatory credit restrictions
E Border tax adjustments
Part VII Other
A Intellectual property issues
B Safeguard measures, emergency actions
C Distribution constraints
D Business practices or restrictions in the market
E Other
Source: World Trade Organization, 2003e.
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TAMING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS:  CONTRIBUTION OF
TRADE FACILITATION
By Yann Duval
Dhar and Kallummal provide an insightful historical report in this chapter on how
the  multilateral  trading  system  has  attempted  to  address  the  issue  of  NTBs,  from  the
Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations in the 1960s to the ongoing Doha Round of WTO
negotiations.  This comprehensive report suggests that, despite wide recognition of the
need to tame NTBs, the multilateral trading system has throughout this extended period
been unable to tackle this issue successfully.
This commentary first elaborates on some important issues raised here by Dhar
and Kallummal and then briefly highlights the relevance of the ongoing trade facilitation
negotiation as a small step towards taming NTBs at the multilateral level.
A.  Negotiating NTBs across existing agreements
While the Doha Ministerial Conference has indeed provided a mandate for introducing
effective disciplines on NTBs, what is – or is not – an NTB remains open to discussion.
The legitimacy of an NTM (e.g., under an existing WTO agreement) and its compliance
with key WTO principles – in particular, the principle of national treatment – appear to
provide a good basis for assessing whether an NTM is, in fact, an NTB.  However, this
approach has the effect of restricting the scope of negotiations during the ongoing round of
negotiation to a subset of potential NTBs.
Specifically, building on the Dhar and Kallummal report presented in this book, and
taking the four-set classification proposed by Canada (World Trade Organization, 2002),
quotas could be negotiated by the Negotiating Group on Market Access (NGMA) while
border-related measures including customs procedures, fees and administration could be
negotiated by the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation (NGTF).  This leaves import
licensing, rules of origin, customs valuation, SPS and TBT out of the current round of
negotiations since they are part of agreements not up for negotiation in the current round.
Given that many, if not most, NTMs identified as barriers to trade are related to agreements
not up for negotiation in the current round, the hope for WTO to find an effective solution to
tame NTBs in this round following this “legalistic” approach would seem rather dim.
As suggested here by Dhar and Kallummal, a decision by WTO members that any
NTMs  related  to  any  WTO  agreements  may  be  assessed  as  potential  NTBs  could  be
a pre-requisite for WTO to be in a position to tame them effectively.  This, however, would
be a major undertaking, which could stall the Doha Round of negotiations completely if
agreed to during this round.176
An alternative, therefore, may be to go along with the legalistic approach and close
this round quickly, following it with a new round more specifically dedicated to addressing
NTBs related to all existing WTO agreements.  This would have the major advantage of
allowing  an  orderly  review  of  all  relevant  agreements  and  their  in-built  mechanisms  to
more  effectively  address  NTBs  –  as  opposed  to  an  add-on,  overlapping  and  possibly
unwieldy  NTB  agreement  that  might  result  from  comprehensive  negotiations  on  NTBs
during this round.
B.  Different modalities for different NTBs
The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  five  modalities  identified  by  NGMA
for  dealing  with  NTBs  are  clearly  described  here  by  Dhar  and  Kallummal  and  do  not
need  further  elaboration.    However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  modalities  are  intrinsically
linked to the nature of NTBs.  Since the nature of NTBs varies widely, it is likely that
a combination of modalities may be needed to tackle them successfully.  For example,
trade  facilitation-related  NTBs  may  be  best  handled  using  a  horizontal  or  request/offer
mechanism, while many of the SPS-related and TBT-related NTBs may be best handled
using vertical (i.e., sectoral) modalities.
This point again provides support for the option of reviewing NTBs under each
relevant WTO agreement rather than as part of a separate agreement on NTBs, as might
be envisaged under the current round, given its agreed scope.
C.  Have members over-negotiated on tariffs?
Dhar and Kallummal provide some evidence of a rise in the number of TBT measures
since 1995, and they argue that the number and spread of the measures are “fast outstripping
and undermining the trade liberalization achieved by way of tariff reduction and elimination”.
While more research may be needed to support that claim, it appears increasingly evident
that the apparent success of the multilateral trading system in reducing tariffs has been
mitigated by a rise in “WTO-compliant” TBTs and other measures perceived by exporters
as de facto NTBs (see figure).
If a negative correlation between tariff levels and the number/frequency of use of
NTBs  exists,  the  nature  of  the  relationship  remains  difficult  to  investigate  conclusively
since there is no observed period during which a rise in (MFN) tariffs has led to either
stabilization or a decrease in TBTs.  Nonetheless, such a negative relationship may have
wide-ranging implications for ongoing and future multilateral trade negotiations.  For example,
exporters may be reluctant to push their governments to negotiate further tariff cuts if there
is a possibility that those cuts might be replaced by NTBs leading to higher overall trade
costs.
Given  the  current  relative  lack  of  transparency  of  many  WTO-compliant  NTMs
notified to the WTO Secretariat, due to the complexity of the measures or the way they are
implemented, many exporters and governments might even consider higher tariffs if they177
were compensated by removal of existing NTBs.  This is something that has happened
before, following the transformation of most quantitative restrictions into tariff equivalents.
That being said, the existing “water” between most favoured nation (MFN) rates
and the applied rates in most WTO member countries makes it unlikely that governments
would be ready to reduce or limit their use of NTBs in exchange for an opportunity to
revise their bound tariffs upward.  This suggests that tariff and non-tariff measures are not
substitutes, making the tariffication of NTBs, other than quantitative barriers or for analytical
purposes
1, a very difficult proposition.  On the other hand, it suggests that even if excessive
reduction in tariffs may have prompted the use of NTBs, backtracking on tariff concessions
would  not  be  a  way  to  tame  NTBs.    Focusing  on  the  simplification,  standardization,
harmonization and transparent implementation of NTMs may be more effective in removing
the “trade protection” element embedded in some of the measures, while ensuring that the
legitimate purposes of the measures are also achieved.
D.  NTBs and the trade facilitation negotiation
Dhar and Kallummal provide an excellent account here of the various and evolving
views on the scope of NTBs.  Interestingly, no less than 95 per cent of NTBs reported by
exporters relate to TBT, Customs and Administrative Procedures, and SPS (Fliess and
Average applied tariffs and number of TBTs, 1996-2005
Source: Ng (2006) and B. Dhar and M. Kallummal, 2007.
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Lejarraga, 2005).  Therefore, since TBTs and SPS are currently not up for negotiation, the
most effective contribution of the Doha Round to taming NTBs, as perceived by exporters,
may be achieved through the negotiations on trade facilitation as they cover at least some
of the measures of concerns to exporters.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the negotiations on trade facilitation are
limited only to GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit), Article VIII (Fees and Formalities) and
Article X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations), such that many NTBs that
fall  within  the  “Customs  and Administrative  Procedures”  mentioned  above  may  not  be
addressed.  Private sector surveys conducted by the Asia-Pacific Research and Training
Network on Trade (ARTNeT) in five developing countries indeed suggest that customs
valuation  (i.e.,  GATT  Article  VII  and  the  related  implementation  agreement)  remain
a primary concern of exporters, although it is outside the scope of the current negotiations
(see table).
Most problematic areas in conducting trade in selected
developing countries in Asia and the Pacific
Overall Bangladesh China Fiji India Indonesia Nepal
ranking ranking ranking ranking ranking ranking  ranking
Customs valuation 1 1 2 2 1 3 2
Inspection and 2 2 6 5 2 2 1
release of goods
Tariff classification 3 3 5 3 3 4 3
Technical or 4 7 1 1 7 5 4
sanitary
requirements
Payment of fees 5 6 4 8 6 1 n.a
and penalties
Obtaining an 6 5 3 7 5 6 n.a
import licence
Submission of 7 4 6 6 4 7 n.a
documents for
clearance
Identification of 8 8 8 4 8 8 n.a
origin of the goods
Sources:Studies in Trade and Investment  No. 57, ESCAP; and ARTNeT Working Paper No. 24.
Nevertheless, what NGTF achieves during this round may give some useful insights
on what may or may not be achieved in a future round of negotiation that may be dedicated
to NTBs.  In that regard, recognition of the importance of capacity-building and technical
assistance in ensuring satisfactory implementation of the measures negotiated, and the
exploration of new, typically softer, mechanisms to monitor compliance (e.g., through peer
and  policy  review  mechanisms),  may  be  particularly  relevant  to  future  negotiations  on
tackling NTBs related to TBT, SPS and other existing WTO agreements.179
Considering the question addressed by Dhar and Kallummal in their paper, another
question that comes to mind at a time when many countries in Asia and the Pacific region
are negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements, is whether these preferential trade
agreements may also provide a solution for taming NTBs.  In that context, rules of origin
and their potential role as NTBs deserve particular attention (e.g., Deb, 2007).180
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